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Abstract: Epistemic akrasia arises when one holds a belief even though one judges it to be irrational or unjustified.  While there is some debate about whether epistemic akrasia is possible, this paper will assume for the sake of argument that it is in order to consider whether it can be rational.  The paper will show that it can.  More precisely, cases can arise in which both the belief one judges to be irrational and one’s judgment of it are epistemically rational in the sense that both are supported by sufficient evidence.


Epistemic akrasia arises when one holds a belief even though one judges it to be irrational or unjustified.  There is some debate about whether epistemic akrasia is possible, but this paper will assume for the sake of argument that it is in order to consider whether it can be rational.​[1]​  More precisely, the paper will consider whether cases can arise in which both the belief one judges to be irrational and one’s judgment of it are epistemically rational.​[2]​
Although some philosophers have claimed that akratic action can occasionally be rational (McIntyre 1990; Arpaly 2003, ch. 2), the prospects for a similar claim regarding epistemic akrasia may still seem dim.  Yet this claim is supported by the thought that human beings are fallible, and that even justified beliefs may in fact be false.  If this fallibility extends to epistemic judgments – judgments about whether one should hold a belief, or whether a belief is rational or justified – then it is possible to judge a belief to be rational when in fact it is not, and to judge that it is not when in fact it is.  Now suppose that someone is epistemically akratic: she rationally judges that her belief that p is irrational.  Since her judgment is fallible, it may turn out to be false, and the belief that p may turn out to be rational.  In that case her akrasia would be epistemically rational insofar as both her belief and her judgment of it would be epistemically rational.
This paper will argue that such cases can arise; in these cases, one is more rational than one thinks.  Specifically, one can have sufficient evidence for the belief that p and sufficient (albeit misleading) evidence for the judgment that one’s belief that p is irrational. If we think of epistemic rationality as a matter of basing one’s beliefs on sufficient evidence, then epistemic akrasia is rational in these cases.  Such a case will be offered in §1, and defended from objections in §§2-4.  We will then be in a position to see how one’s total evidence can support both the belief that p and the judgment that the belief that p is irrational; in other words, we will be in a position to see how rational epistemic akrasia is possible.

1.  A Case of Rational Epistemic Akrasia
Typical examples of akratic action include cases in which one succumbs to temptation: the dieter knows he should refuse desert, but orders the cheesecake anyway; the student knows she should be studying, but watches the movie anyway.  Instances of epistemic akrasia offered in the literature are often analogues of these cases: the akratic believer succumbs to seductive but non-evidential considerations, as when one believes the charismatic person who one knows is not trustworthy.  The epistemic temptation may even be a good non-epistemic reason for belief, as when one has good non-evidential reasons to trust a loved one’s protests of innocence, in spite of strong evidence of his guilt.​[3]​  But insofar as the akratic state is a response to non-evidential considerations, it is epistemically irrational.
However, epistemic akrasia need not arise as a response to non-evidential considerations; on the contrary, it may be a response to purely evidential considerations. Consider, for example, the following case.  Watson is a promising apprentice of Holmes, a master sleuth. As part of his training, Watson will often accompany Holmes to crime scenes and other locations, size up the evidence as best he can, and tell Holmes what conclusion he has drawn and how he has drawn it.  Holmes will then assess Watson’s conclusion as rational or irrational, though not as true or false.  Of course this assessment is based in part on whether Holmes thinks the evidence supports the conclusion.  But just as a logic student may use invalid steps to arrive at a conclusion that follows validly from the premises, so too Watson may use poor reasoning to arrive at a conclusion that is nevertheless supported by the evidence.  In such a case, Watson would be irrational in holding his conclusion, and Holmes will assess it accordingly.  Thus it is possible for Holmes to arrive at the same conclusion from the same evidence as Watson, and still claim that Watson’s belief is irrational.  Watson is aware of this, and so he cannot infer from such a claim that Holmes thinks his conclusion is false.  In fact, he cannot even infer that Holmes thinks that the evidence does not support his conclusion.  All he can infer is that Holmes thinks that he has arrived at his conclusion irrationally.  This is by design: Watson is to consider the evidence on his own until he arrives at a conclusion rationally, and his knowing Holmes’s own conclusions would interfere with this.
Now suppose that Holmes brings Watson to a crime scene, that the evidence indicates that the butler is guilty, and that Watson uses good reasoning to arrive at that conclusion.  In short, Watson rationally believes that the butler did it.  But when he tells Holmes of his conclusion and how he arrived at it, Holmes’s only response is, “Your conclusion is irrational.” Since Holmes is a master sleuth, Watson is justified in believing that he is correct: Holmes’s testimony on these matters is very authoritative.  But authoritative though he is, he is not infallible, and this is one of the rare occasions in which he is wrong.  So when Watson accepts Holmes’s assessment, he accepts a falsehood.  Watson, then, may reasonably but wrongly judge that his conclusion is irrational.  Therefore, if he nevertheless maintains his belief in the butler’s guilt, both it and his epistemic judgment of it are rational.  Yet in holding them both, he is akratic.
Watson’s case is different from typical cases of akrasia considered in the literature, since his akratic belief is generated entirely by evidential considerations.  In particular, Watson forms his belief in response to evidence that both seems sufficient to him and in fact is sufficient, and he uses reasoning that both seems good to him and in fact is good.  Of course, after hearing from Holmes, he thinks that his reasoning merely seems good when in fact it is not, and he suspects that the evidence merely seems sufficient when in fact it is not.  Thus, when asked why he believes that the butler is guilty, he might say, “Well, I know these are not good reasons, but …” and then proceed to give excellent epistemic reasons and evidence for thinking the butler guilty.
One might object that, if Watson's evidence is this strong, then he should reject Holmes's assessment.  This concern is especially pressing if we imagine Watson reflecting on the reasoning that initially led him to his conclusion, and finding nothing wrong with it.  But even then, it does not follow that he should reject Holmes's assessment.  After all, he has good reason to think that Holmes is better at finding flaws in reasoning than he is, and so has good reason to think that Holmes may have found a flaw that he cannot see.  To underscore the point, we can stipulate that this sort of situation has arisen in the past, and that Watson eventually had to ask Holmes what was wrong with his reasoning.  In every case, Holmes has shown Watson his error, and so Watson could reasonably suspect that this is another one of those cases.
Alternatively, one might object that Watson’s belief that the butler is guilty is irrational, and we will consider objections of this sort in the following sections of this paper.  However, the fact that Watson’s belief regarding the butler is based on strong evidence places a burden on all such objections.  Specifically, they cannot claim that Watson’s akratic belief is irrational because it is motivated by non-evidential considerations.  Thus, they must find some other way of explaining why it is, as they claim, irrational.  Their options here are quite limited.  After all, before he spoke to Holmes, Watson’s belief was, by hypothesis, perfectly rational.  And the only change in his epistemic circumstances is that he has heard Holmes’s assessment.  So, any objection that claims that his belief is irrational must show that Holmes’s assessment of it somehow explains why it is irrational.
There are several ways one might try to show this.  One of them, however, can be quickly set aside.  According to it, Holmes’s assessment is itself evidence that Watson’s belief is false and that the butler is innocent.  The claim need not be that Holmes’s assessment is sufficient to establish the butler’s innocence, but only that it is sufficient to cast serious doubt on his guilt.  For in that case, it would be irrational of Watson to continue to believe in his guilt.  However, it is a mistake to think of Holmes’s assessment as counterevidence.  Recall that Holmes may criticize Watson’s belief as irrational even though he thinks it is true, if he thinks Watson arrived at it in an irrational manner.  Since Watson knows this, he cannot treat Holmes’s assessment as evidence favoring the butler.  Moreover, the sheer fact – if it were a fact – that his belief is irrational would not itself be evidence of its falsehood.  There are very many ways to hold a belief irrationally, even if it is true.  So the mere fact that someone holds a belief in one of those ways is hardly evidence that it is not true.

2.  An Objection
	One might object that Watson’s akrasia is irrational because, after having heard from Holmes, it is epistemically blameworthy of him to retain his belief that the butler is guilty.  After all, even if Holmes is wrong and Watson’s belief is objectively rational, retaining a belief one judges to be irrational is irresponsible and therefore blameworthy.  Thus, Watson’s belief about the butler is irrational, at least in a subjective sense, and his is not a case of rational akrasia.
	This objection turns on a notion of epistemic blameworthiness, which is often explained by analogy to cases of moral akrasia.​[4]​  Suppose that someone – call him Bob – is morally weak or akratic: he intends to do something he knows to be morally wrong, such as poisoning an enemy to get revenge.  However, instead of giving the victim poison, he accidentally gives her a cure for the terrible disease from which she suffers.  Bob has done something that is objectively morally right, yet he is nevertheless blameworthy because he believes that what he is doing is morally wrong.​[5]​  This example seems to show that one is morally blameworthy when one judges one’s action to be morally wrong, even if it is in fact morally right.  Note that it does not matter whether Bob’s judgment about the morality of his action is rational or irrational.  For example, there may be ample evidence that what he is giving her is a cure, and therefore that what he is doing is morally good.  Nevertheless, because he thinks that what he is doing is morally wrong, his action is morally blameworthy.
In short, one is morally blameworthy when one judges one’s action to be morally wrong, even if the action is in fact morally right.  By analogy, one is epistemically blameworthy when one judges one’s action to be epistemically irrational, even if the belief is in fact epistemically rational.  Since this is what Watson does, he is epistemically blameworthy.  According to the objection we are considering, epistemically blameworthy beliefs are irrational, at least in a subjective sense.  So, Watson’s belief about the butler is subjectively irrational.
	The trouble with this objection lies in its claim that Watson’s belief is epistemically blameworthy.  Now, one way to rebut to this claim would be to argue that we can only be blamed for what we do voluntarily, and that, since beliefs are not under our voluntary control, we cannot be blamed for what we believe.​[6]​  However, such a rebuttal would raise thorny questions regarding the sense, if any, in which beliefs are voluntary, and the extent to which epistemic blameworthiness depends on doxastic voluntarism.  But because these issues lie beyond the scope of this paper, we may simply grant the objection’s contention that we can be blameworthy for holding some of our beliefs.
	But even if some beliefs are epistemically blameworthy, Watson’s is not one of them.  To see why, it will help to turn to a different case of moral akrasia, that of Mark Twain’s Huckleberry Finn.  Huck is a boy traveling down the Mississippi River in the antebellum South with a runaway slave, Jim.  Huck accepts that slaves are property, and believes he should turn Jim in to the authorities.  But when the opportunity arises, he finds he cannot bring himself to do so, and continues to help Jim escape.  Like Bob, he judges his action to be morally wrong, even though it is in fact morally right.  But unlike Bob, Huck seems to be praiseworthy rather than blameworthy.  So we should not assume that agents are always blameworthy when they do what they judge to be morally wrong.
	Once we have seen why Huck is praiseworthy while Bob is blameworthy, we will be in a better position to evaluate Watson.  While Bob’s moral judgment is rational, Huck’s moral judgment is not; Huck presumably had sufficient evidence of Jim’s humanity before getting to know him, and in any case certainly had plenty of evidence after traveling down the Mississippi with him.  So we might suppose that Bob is morally blameworthy because he acts contrary to a rational moral judgment, while Huck is not blameworthy because he acts contrary to an irrational moral judgment.  But this cannot be quite right; as we have seen, Bob would be blameworthy even if his moral judgment were irrational.  Rather, as Nomy Arpaly has argued, Huck is praiseworthy because his action is motivated by the properties that make it right (2003, pp. 75-8).  That is, the reasons why the action is right, and Huck’s motives for doing it, are the same.  In particular, Huck has come to treat Jim as an equal – for example, at one point he apologizes to Jim – even though he has not altered his moral judgment accordingly.  And he is unable to turn Jim in precisely because his motivations respond to Jim’s humanity even if his moral beliefs do not.
	In contrast, Bob is not motivated by the properties that make his action right.  On the contrary, he is not even aware of these properties (that is, he is not aware that he is curing his intended victim of her disease).  Instead, he is motivated by properties that he mistakenly thinks his action has (namely, he is motivated by the thought that he is poisoning her).  Moreover, if his action actually had the properties he thinks it has, then it would be immoral.  Thus, he is motivated by properties that, were they present, would make the action immoral.  This is the reason why his action is morally blameworthy.
	In short, Huck and Bob are alike in that they both judge that what they are doing morally wrong, yet what they do is objectively morally right.  The difference between them is the nature of the reasons that motivate them: Huck is motivated by the right-making features of his action, whereas Bob is motivated by features that would be wrong-making were they present.  And it is not hard to see why this difference matters.  Insofar as Huck is sensitive to the right-making features of his action, we can say that he genuinely cares about morality.  Of course, he does not realize this; that is, he does not realize that the considerations that motivate him are moral.  But of course this does not change the fact that they are.  In contrast, Bob is not sensitive to, or even aware of, the right-making features of his actions.  Thus, he does not care about morality, at least not enough to be motivated by it, and the fact that he does what is objectively right is merely a happy coincidence.
	Most examples of epistemic akrasia discussed in the literature resemble Bob’s case rather than Huck’s.  In those cases, subjects base their beliefs on non-evidential considerations, such as the charisma of an interlocutor or the love of a family member.  Analogously, Bob bases his decision on a non-moral consideration: a desire for revenge.  Thus, subjects in these cases may be as epistemically blameworthy as Bob is morally blameworthy, since they no more care about evidence than Bob cares about morality.
In contrast, Watson’s case is the analogue of Huck’s case, not Bob’s.  Watson’s belief that the butler is guilty is based on, or motivated by, the evidence at the scene.  Thus, just as the reason why Huck’s act is right and the considerations that motivated him are the same, so the reason why Watson’s belief is objectively rational and the reason why he holds it are the same.  Moreover, just as we could say that Huck genuinely cares about morality, so we can say that Watson genuinely cares about evidence.  Of course, he does not realize that he has responded to the evidence at the scene in an epistemically rational way, but this does not change the fact that his response is in fact epistemically rational.  Thus, Watson’s belief is epistemically praiseworthy in the same way Huck’s action is morally praiseworthy, and the argument from his blameworthiness to his subjective irrationality relies on a false premise.
Admittedly, Watson’s case is not entirely analogous to Huck’s.  In particular, Huck’s moral judgment of his action is irrational, while Watson’s epistemic judgment of his belief is rational.  However, this difference is not relevant to the argument of this section, since, as we have seen, the rationality of one’s judgment does not determine whether one is blameworthy.  Yet it does explain why Huck’s moral akrasia is not rational even if Watson’s is.  One’s epistemic akrasia is rational when both one’s belief and one’s judgment of it are rational; analogously, moral akrasia is rational when both one’s action and one’s judgment of it are rational.  However, Huck’s moral judgment is not rational while Watson’s epistemic judgment is, and this implies that Huck’s akrasia is irrational even though it clearly does not imply that Watson’s is.
One might nevertheless insist that, even if Watson is not blameworthy, he is still subjectively irrational because he judges that he is irrational.  However, once it is severed from a notion of blameworthiness, the charge of subjective irrationality seems rather toothless: subjective irrationality would simply consist in subjects judging their beliefs to be irrational.  One might just as well insist that an objectively cubical block is subjectively spherical if one believes it is spherical.

3.  A Second Objection
One might object although Watson’s belief that the butler is guilty is initially rational given his evidence, Holmes’s assessment defeats Watson’s belief.​[7]​  Like the previous objection, this objection holds that Watson is irrational because his first order belief about the butler is irrational.  Unlike the previous objection, however, this objection holds that this belief is objectively irrational, given the information available to Watson.​[8]​
This objection casts Holmes’s assessment in the role of a defeater, which we may define as follows:
Defeaters: A consideration d is a defeater for the belief that p on evidence e if and only if it is rational to believe p on e but not rational to believe p on both e and d.​[9]​
For example, it may be rational to believe that it is raining outside given that there are drops of water on the windowpane.  But it may not be rational to believe this given that there are drops of water on the windowpane and that the sprinkler system is on.  The fact that the sprinkler system is on would then play the role of a defeater.
Note that on this definition, a consideration plays the role of a defeater just in case its presence makes an otherwise rational belief irrational.  Strictly speaking, then, a consideration cannot defeat a belief that is already irrational.  For some purposes, this definition might be an objectionable limitation; for example, for some purposes, we may wish to count any consideration that lowers the probability of a belief as a defeater.  But for present purposes, this definition is just what we need.  After all, the objection we are considering holds that Holmes’s assessment makes Watson’s otherwise rational belief in the butler’s guilt irrational.  The objection therefore holds that Holmes’s assessment plays the role of a defeater in precisely the sense specified by our definition.
To assess this objection, note first that Holmes’s assessment is what we may call second order evidence:
Second Order Evidence: A consideration c is second order evidence regarding the belief that p on evidence e if and only if it is evidence that p is (or is not) rational on e (where c is not part of e).
Holmes’s assessment is evidence for Watson that his belief that the butler is guilty is not rational given his evidence at the scene, and so it qualifies as second order evidence.​[10]​  In effect, then, the objection implies that Holmes’s assessment is both a defeater for Watson’s belief given the evidence at the scene and second order evidence that his belief is not rational on that evidence.  More generally, the objection implies that a consideration can be both second order evidence that a proposition p is irrational on evidence e and be a defeater for p on e.
However, the claim that second-order evidence is a defeater generates a rather peculiar result.  As a defeater, it makes an otherwise rational belief irrational, but as second order evidence, it indicates that the belief is not otherwise rational. That is, if a consideration is a defeater for p on e, then p is rational on e; but if it is also second order evidence, then it indicates that p is not rational on e, in which case it is misleading second order evidence.  In general, then, a consideration can be both second order evidence and a defeater for a belief only if it is misleading second order evidence.  For example, Holmes’s assessment is second order evidence that Watson’s belief is irrational given the evidence at the crime scene, and it counts as a defeater for his belief on that evidence only if his belief is rational on that evidence.  But if his belief was initially rational on the evidence, then Holmes’s assessment is misleading second order evidence.  In effect, Holmes’s assessment can be a defeater only if it is false.  Now there is nothing peculiar in the idea that a consideration can defeat a belief even when it is false, or in the idea that defeaters are sometimes misleading.  What is peculiar is that idea that it can defeat a belief only when it is false or otherwise misleading; what is peculiar, in other words, is the idea that a consideration’s having the status of a defeater entails that it is false or misleading.
To see why this peculiarity is problematic, consider the situation from Watson’s point of view.  Suppose that Watson considers Holmes’s assessment to be true, which of course he has good reason to do.  He may then conclude that his belief is irrational, not in virtue of Holmes’s assessment, but in virtue of some error in the reasoning that initially led him to his belief.  This is why it would make sense for him to reexamine his reasoning, looking for an error.  And if he does not find one yet continues to believe that Holmes’s assessment is true, then it would make sense for him to conclude that he has overlooked an error in his reasoning.  So if Watson regards Holmes’s assessment as true, then he must hold that his belief is not rational given his initial evidence. But in that case, Holmes’s assessment does not count as a defeater.  So, if Watson regards Holmes’s assessment as true, he cannot rationally regard it as playing the role of a defeater.
The point, of course, is not simply that he cannot regard Holmes’s assessment as satisfying a particular definition of a defeater.  Rather, the larger point is that he cannot regard Holmes’s assessment as making his belief irrational if he regards that assessment as true.  Instead, he must regard his belief as having been irrational prior to and independently of his hearing the assessment. Thus, he can see Holmes’s assessment as playing the role of second order evidence, and he can accordingly change his mind about whether his belief is rational.  But he cannot see the status of his belief itself as changing from rational to irrational.  
Now suppose that Watson considers Holmes’s assessment to be false.  In that case, he regards his belief to be rational on the evidence initially available to him at the crime scene, and the question is whether he can regard Holmes’s assessment as a defeater for his belief on this evidence.  But surely he cannot: Watson cannot rationally say, “Holmes is wrong to say that my belief is irrational given my evidence, yet his saying this makes my belief irrational anyway. So, as things now stand, my belief is irrational.”  If Watson thinks that Holmes is wrong, it would surely make more sense for him to conclude not only that his belief was rational given his initial evidence, but also that it is still rational.  Thus, if Watson regards Holmes’s assessment as false, then he could regard it as misleading second order evidence, and perhaps he could even regard it as a defeated defeater (though this is debatable).  But he could not regard it as making an otherwise rational belief irrational, and so he could not regard it as playing the role of a defeater.  Whether he regards Holmes’s assessment as true or false, then, Watson cannot see it as defeating his belief.
In general, subjects cannot regard the rational status of their current beliefs as dependent on assessments of that status or on the second order evidence for such assessments.  If Watson regards Holmes’s assessment as true, then he has to think of it as true because his initial reasoning was faulty.  But in that case, he has to think of his belief as irrational prior to and independently of Holmes’s assessment.  And if he thinks Holmes’s assessment is false, then he has to regard his belief as rational in spite of – and hence independently of – that assessment.  But, if we cannot regard the rationality of our current first-order beliefs as dependent upon our second-order evidence, then we cannot regard the rational status of our beliefs as having changed when we encounter such evidence.  And this means that we cannot regard such evidence as undefeated defeaters of our current first-order beliefs.
This conclusion is confirmed when we imagine a subject like Watson regarding second order evidence as a defeater.  Watson would then think, “My belief was initially rational on the evidence. But when Holmes said that it was irrational, it thereby became irrational.”  According to the objection we are considering in this section, Watson would be exactly right.  Yet it would be bizarre of Watson to think this: if he judges that his belief is initially rational on the evidence, he should conclude that it is still rational and that Holmes is wrong; and if he judges that his belief is now irrational, then he should judge that an error in his initial reasoning from the evidence makes it irrational, not Holmes’s assessment.  He, for one, should therefore disagree with the objection’s claim that Holmes’s assessment is a defeater.
The issue now is whether a consideration can be a defeater even though subjects who encounter it can never rationally regard it as an undefeated defeater.  To settle this, consider what we may call the Transparency Requirement, which permits epistemic theories to identify a consideration as evidence (or as a defeater) only if it is possible for those who encounter the consideration rationally to regard it as undefeated evidence (or as an undefeated defeater) for one of their current beliefs.  The idea is that a theory that specifies what considerations count as evidence and as defeaters should not itself preclude those who encounter these considerations from regarding them as evidence and as defeaters.  This is because evidence and defeaters are at least in part constituted by the role they play in the rational formation and revision of beliefs.  But if subjects can never rationally regard a consideration as undefeated evidence (or as an undefeated defeater) for one of their current beliefs, then it can never rationally play that role.  And if it can never rationally play a role that is in part constitutive of evidence and defeaters, then it is neither evidence nor a defeater.​[11]​
The trouble with the claim that Holmes’s assessment is a defeater is that it violates the Transparency Requirement.  This is because Watson, as we have seen, cannot regard Holmes’s assessment as a defeater.  In general, subjects cannot regard second order evidence as defeaters, and so the claim that they are defeaters violates the Transparency Requirement.
It is plausible to suppose that the rationality of a belief depends in some way on the subject’s epistemic perspective.  The objection under consideration here offers a specific account of this dependence: a belief is irrational if the subject has sufficient reason to judge it as irrational.  Surprisingly, perhaps, this account itself fails to make sense from subjects’ own epistemic perspective.  While they may regard second-order evidence as indicating the rational status of their current beliefs, they cannot rationally regard that evidence as altering the status of those beliefs, and so cannot rationally regard them as defeaters.  The objection’s account of the way in which the rationality of a belief depends upon the subject’s perspective thereby violates the Transparency Requirement.  The objection therefore fails.

4.  A Third Objection
Admittedly, it seems counterintuitive to say that epistemic akrasia can sometimes be rational, and this is largely because it seems irrational of subjects to treat their akratic beliefs as if they were rational.  So, for example, it seems irrational of subjects to act on their akratic beliefs, and it seems perfectly rational of them to abandon those beliefs.  And this in turn seems to be reason to suspect that these beliefs are irrational after all.
Consider first the objection that akratic beliefs must be irrational, since it is irrational to act on them.  To illustrate the objection, consider a bet in which Watson wins $5 if the butler is guilty, and loses $10 if he is innocent.  This is a good bet (in the sense that it maximizes expected value) if the probability that the butler is guilty is greater that .67, and a bad bet if it is lower than .67.  The probability that the butler is guilty given only the evidence at the scene is presumably greater than .67, so it would be rational of Watson to take the bet, i.e., to act on his belief.  But after hearing from Holmes, it would not be rational for him to act on his belief, and in particular it would not be rational of him to take the bet.  Hearing from Holmes must therefore have reduced the probability that the butler is guilty to less than .67.  But then it is irrational of Watson to continue to hold this belief.​[12]​
Unfortunately, there is a problem this objection must overcome if it is to be successful.  Granted, after hearing from Holmes, it is rational of Watson to think that his belief that the butler is guilty is irrational, and so it is rational of him to think that taking the bet would be irrational.  The objection then concludes that taking the bet really would be irrational because Watson’s belief really is irrational.  But this just presupposes that Holmes’s assessment defeats Watson’s belief, which is precisely the point at issue.  The problem, then, is that the objection must show that it is irrational to act on akratic beliefs without presupposing that these beliefs are irrational.  Otherwise, the objection will beg the question.
Perhaps, however, the objection can avoid this problem.​[13]​  Regardless of whether Watson’s akratic belief is in fact irrational, Watson certainly thinks it is. Accordingly, regardless of whether the bet is in fact irrational, Watson certainly thinks it is.  But it is a rational policy not to make bets one believes are irrational, since acting on this policy will likely maximize expected value in the long run.  And since acting contrary to a rational policy is a form of practical irrationality, Watson would be practically irrational to make the bet, and agents in general would be irrational to act on their akratic beliefs.  Thus, we can claim that it is irrational of Watson to make the bet without assuming that his akratic belief is defeated, and hence without begging the question.
However, while this argument may show that it is irrational of Watson to make the bet, it does not allow us to conclude that his akratic belief is irrational.  On the contrary, it allows us to conclude that it would be irrational of Watson to act on his belief even if that belief is in fact rational.  The objection invokes a policy that maximizes expected value over the long run, and such a policy may on occasion require us to refrain from performing actions that do maximize expected value.  To borrow an example from Bernard Williams, a utility company may maximize value over the long run by sending out all bills when due, even though some bills charge less that the cost of processing them (1972, p. 92).  Similarly, the policy of not making bets on akratic beliefs may maximize expected value in the long run even if it occasionally requires one to refrain from making a bet that maximizes expected value.  This means that the objection does not rule out the possibility that Watson’s bet does in fact maximize expected value even though Watson thinks it does not, and hence does not rule out the possibility that his belief is in fact rational even though he thinks it is not.
A similar dialectic applies to the objection that it would be rational of Watson to abandon his akratic belief, and that his belief must therefore be irrational.  If we say that it is rational of him to abandon his akratic belief because that belief is irrational, then we have begged the question.  To avoid this, we could say that it is a rational policy to abandon beliefs one judges to be irrational, since this is likely to yield a more rational set of beliefs over the long run.  This would allow us to conclude that it is rational of Watson to abandon his belief regardless of whether that belief is rational, and hence would allow us to avoid begging the question.  But for reasons we have just seen, we would then be unable to conclude that Watson’s belief is in fact irrational.  Instead, we could only conclude that it is rational of Watson to abandon his belief even if that belief is in fact rational.
Although these objections fail, they do offer an important insight: second-order evidence may give us a reason to treat our beliefs as though they are irrational, even if it does not make our beliefs irrational.  Nor would this be a surprising result.  To borrow another example from Williams, we might have evidence that the stuff in the glass is gin, when in fact it is petrol (1981, p. 102).  In that case, our evidence gives us a reason to treat the stuff as though it were gin; for example, we may have (subjective) reason to mix it with tonic and drink it.  But of course this does not mean that the evidence turns the stuff into gin, not even subjective gin (whatever that would mean).  Similarly, second-order evidence may give us a reason to treat a belief as though it were irrational; for example, we may have reason to refrain from acting on it and to abandon it.  But it does not follow that second-order evidence makes the belief irrational, not even subjectively irrational.  And the argument of this section helps us to see why this is so: rational policies regarding belief formation and revision may require us to occasionally abandon beliefs that are, unbeknownst to us, based on sufficient evidence.

5.  Conclusion
Clearly, the claim that Holmes’s assessment is second-order evidence satisfies the Transparency Requirement.  Moreover, its status as second-order evidence is sufficient to explain why it is rational of Watson to avoid betting on his akratic belief, and even to explain why he might rationally abandon it.  The claim that it is a defeater, in contrast, violates the Transparency Requirement and in any case is not necessary for explaining these things.  Thus, we may conclude that although Holmes’s assessment is second-order evidence, it is not a defeater.  And since Watson’s akratic belief is based on undefeated evidence, it is rational.
We are now in a position to state in general terms conditions under which epistemic akrasia may be rational.  Like all evidence, second-order evidence can sometimes be misleading.  When it is, we can rationally judge that our belief is irrational even though it is in fact rational, and so we can rationally be akratic.  This is precisely what has happened in Watson’s case.  Holmes's assessment is (sufficient) evidence that Watson’s belief is irrational, and it therefore justifies Watson's epistemic judgment that his belief is irrational.  But Holmes is mistaken about Watson's belief, and so his assessment is misleading evidence.  Thus, both Watson's belief and his epistemic judgment of it are rational, even though together they constitute epistemic akrasia.
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^1	  Millgram (1997) and Hookway (2001) affirm its possibility, while Adler (2002) Hurley (1992, ch. 8) deny it.  David Owens (2002) claims that epistemic akrasia, as I have defined it, can occur.  But he claims that those afflicted with it lack control over their beliefs, and so on his view there is no epistemic analogue to deliberate akratic action.  This paper will focus only on the rational status of akratic beliefs, and not on the sense, if any, in which they are under our control.
^2	  For the sake of clarity, I will use the term ‘belief’ to refer to first-order beliefs, and ‘judgment’ to refer to second-order evaluations of beliefs.  Also, ‘rational’ here means, roughly, ‘adequately supported by reasons or evidence’.  Finally, although I am not arguing the point here, I suspect that the possibility of epistemic akrasia will seem more plausible once its rationality seems plausible.
^3	  The first sort of example is used by Milgram (1997; 129-30) and the second by Hookway (2001; 185).
^4	  See, for example, William Alston (1989).
^5	  This example is from Bruce Russell (2001).
^6	  Alston provides an argument along these lines in his (1989).
^7	  This idea closely resembles what Michael Bergman (1997) calls the No-Defeater Condition, according to which “a person’s belief that p is not warranted if she believes that p is defeated” (p. 407).
^8	  According to this objection, subjectively irrational beliefs are also objectively irrational.  Roughly speaking, one’s belief is objectively irrational if it is not in fact supported by sufficient evidence, and defeated beliefs are not so supported.  And one’s belief is subjectively irrational if one has reason to think that it is irrational.  But according to the objection here, a reason to judge a belief to be irrational is defeater, which renders the belief objectively irrational.  This point highlights an important respect in which the objection we considered in the previous section differs from the one we are considering here.  Whereas the previous objection held that a subjectively irrational belief is blameworthy even if it is objectively rational, the present objection holds that a subjectively irrational belief is necessarily also objectively irrational.  In other words, the present objection holds that if a belief is objectively rational then it is also subjectively rational.  For a recent defense of this entailment, see John Gibbons (2006); for doubts about it, see Richard Feldman (1996).
^9	  See Pollock and Cruz (1999, p. 35) for similar definition.
^10	  To be clear, it is worth noting that Holmes’s assessment is not necessarily second order evidence that the butler’s guilt cannot be inferred from the evidence at the scene: we left open the possibility that the evidence does indicate the butler’s guilt and that Watson has merely reasoned poorly from that evidence to that conclusion.  Whether a belief is ‘rational on the evidence’ is here intended to take this possibility into account.
^11	  The point here is that the theory should not count certain considerations as evidence if the theory itself precludes rational subjects from regarding them as undefeated evidence.  Such a theory would be incoherent.  But this does not rule out the possibility that an authoritative instructor like Holmes can mislead a rational student like Watson about what is and is not evidence.  In that case, a theory may count a consideration as evidence even though Holmes has precluded Watson from regarding it as such.  This does not reflect any incoherence on the part of the theory, but rather a mistake on the part of Holmes.
^12	  The objection needs probabilities and payoffs such that (a) it is rational to make the bet prior to Holmes’s assessment and irrational afterwards, and (b) the change in the irrationality of the bet is attributable to a change in the rationality of Watson’s belief regarding the butler.  The probabilities and payoffs in the example in the text have been chosen to meet these conditions.  But readers may substitute their own probabilities and payoffs in whatever way best satisfies them that these conditions are met.
^13	  Stewart Cohen suggested this line of argument to me in correspondence.
^14	  I would like to thank Scott Aikin, Stewart Cohen, Chris King, Elijah Millgram, Peter Murphy, and Christopher Pynes for helpful comments and suggestions on drafts of this paper and its ancestors.  A version of the paper was read at the 2004 Tennessee Philosophical Society, and I would like to thank my audience there for helpful discussion, with special thanks to my commentator, James Montmarquet.
